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SHEILA HOLLIS
I. Developments in the Energy Sectors of the Baltic Republics
A. BACKGROUND
Since regaining their independence from the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the
Baltic Republics, including Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, have attempted to eliminate the
vestiges of a command economy that was in place for approximately fifty years. The collapse
of the U.S.S.R. wreaked havoc on the energy sectors in the Baltic region, as energy output
plummeted and energy prices soared in response to the loss of Soviet markets, the primary
users of power produced by the Baltic countries.' In recent years, the Baltic States have directed
their attention to restructuring their respective energy sectors. To this end, the countries have
enacted privatization and foreign investment laws. Traditional vertically integrated, state-owned
monopolies in the electric and gas sectors gradually are becoming privately owned entities.
The attempts at reform vary among the Republics, as is illustrated below.
B. EsTONIA
Although the smallest of the Baltic Republics, Estonia is at the forefront in rehabilitating
its energy sector.' Like the other Baltic nations, Estonia amended its legal framework to facilitate
reform. Estonia followed the East German model of seeking out core investors to purchase
state-owned companies, rather than a "mass privatization" approach.' The Estonian Privatiza-
tion Agency administers privatization of state property through public auctions, direct sales,
and sales by negotiation.4 In addition to privatization laws, Estonia also has enacted favorable
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foreign investment regulations that are liberal and nondiscriminatory to foreigners.' As a result,
Estonia has achieved a successful level of substantial foreign direct investment.6
The Estonian Government adopted a two-phase process to reform its energy sector. The
initial step requires restructuring of state-owned utilities prior to actual privatization.' For
example, Eesti Energia, the major electric power monopoly, was virtually restructured into
three business entities: production, transmission, and distribution.8 Privatization efforts were
subsequently undertaken. 9 The government, at least in the short term, remains unwilling,
however, to sell a majority of any shares to investors due to the significant influence of Eesti
Energia on the Estonian economy.io Thus, Eesti Energia will remain majority-owned by the
government for some time with private industries holding minority interests. The Estonian
Government has, nevertheless, permitted other state-owned utilities to become wholly privat-
ized. Eesti Gaas, an internationally owned stock corporation handling gas import and distribu-
tion, recently completed its privatization process whereby the Estonian Government sold off
its remaining thirty-nine percent stake in the company."
Finally, Estonia has drafted a comprehensive law, the Energy Act, with an effective date of
January 1, 1997, to implement regulatory reform.' The Act provides for unrestricted competi-
tion in a liberal free-market system for the power sector, endorsing freedom to contract between
generators and users of power." Transmission and distribution would be regulated, but only
to the extent necessary to protect public interests. 4 The Act has set forth the following goals:
(1) separation of power generation, transmission, and distribution; (2) creation of a regulatory
body to oversee the energy market; (3) guarantee of third-party access to the grid; (4) transparency
of pricing and accounting; and (5) encouragement of foreign private investment and technical
assistance. "
C. LrrHUANIA
Overall, the pace of privatization of the energy sector in Lithuania has been slower than in
Estonia. Although Lithuania has enacted privatization and foreign investment laws similar to
those of the other Baltic States, Lithuania has failed to promote privatization and foreign
investment to the degree seen in Estonia." Lithuania generally has been reluctant to sell state-
owned utilities to private investors."
Lithuania, as a nation deficient in natural resources, is highly dependent on imports of fuels
and raw materials from neighboring countries, including Russia. Lietuvos Dujos, the state-run
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gas import and distribution company, has a debtor relationship with Russia. 8 The Lithuanian
Government has announced its intention to sell approximately thirty percent of Lietuvos Dujos
to investors." In the future, the government would like to privatize at least some of the electric
generation, distribution, and transmission sectors.2° So far, however, Lithuania's restructuring
efforts have been confined to the privatization of ancillary energy services.2
The Butinge oil import terminal recently was privatized with the limitation that no single
foreign investor would be able to purchase more than fifty percent of the shares in the planned
terminal.22 In another development, the Lithuanian Government has approved a plan to merge
four of the country's leading oil companies, including a refinery, a terminal, a pipeline group
and a petrol retailer, to form a new oil company, Lietuvos Nafta, that would be privatized
via an international share offering in 1997.23 In contrast to Estonia's approach favoring core
investors, the government is prepared to limit its stake in the company to thirty-four percent,
but it intends to remain the single, largest owner.24 The government is seeking to establish
broad-based ownership in Lietuvos Nafta. Lithuania hopes that the merger of these oil companies
will increase the attractiveness of business in Lithuania to foreign investors. 2
D. LATviA
Latvia, like Lithuania, is poor in natural resources and heavily reliant on imports for the
production of energy. Nevertheless, the country passed regulatory legislation in the form of
an energy law in 1995 to increase efficiency, customer choice, and competition, as well as
regulate licenses and tariffs.26 Although Latvia is trying to encourage foreign direct investment,
its laws contain various restrictions that are burdensome to potential foreign investors.27 Thus,
privatization of industry in Latvia has gone slowly, but steadily.
The Latvian Government is working to restructure its role with the vertically integrated
electric monopoly, Latvenergo, from owner to regulator.28 Privatization of Latvenergo, is
planned whereby twenty-five to thirty-five percent of the company will be privately owned
through a sale of new shares to investors. 2' The government decided, however, that prior to
privatization, the enterprise ought to be transformed into a holding company.'" On other fronts,
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Latvian Gas is close to completing its current privatization process. Gazprom of Russia and
the German consortium Ruhrgas/Preussenelektra were awarded winning bids to purchase a
total of thirty-three percent of the company."
Finally, an on-going dispute over the maritime borders between Latvia and Lithuania has
hampered efforts to develop oil resources in the Baltic Sea.32 The disagreement between the
two Republics has underscored the need of both countries to diversify their pool of imported
resources, or ideally, to develop domestic energy resources within their respective countries.
Hopefully, foreign investment and privatization will encourage these development efforts to
the benefit of these Republics.
The Baltic Republics have made remarkable inroads in rehabilitating their respective energy
sectors within a short time. Nevertheless, this remains a "work-in-progress."
II. Independent Power Projects in India
In recent years, India has experienced a tremendous growth in demand for electric power.
However, insufficient generation capacity failed to satisfy the growing demand, resulting in
power shortages throughout the country." In 1991, the Indian Government initiated an expan-
sion program designed to increase generation capacity.' 4 To this end, India opened its power
generation sector to private developers that would obtain the capital required to undertake
private power projects in India." Private investors, induding domestic and foreign, applauded
the Indian government's liberalization of its power sector.' 6 Several companies initiated negotia-
tions with the federal and state governments for private, independent power projects (IPPs).'"
However, India's program to expand power generation has failed to fulfill its initial expecta-
tions. " As is discussed in this article, IPPs have encountered numerous bureaucratic and political
hurdles making implementation of IPPs a frustrating endeavor for investors. Private investors
seeking to penetrate the Indian independent power market should be prepared for a long-term
commitment of financial, political, and human resources in order to reap anticipated benefits.
A. GROWTH IN POWER DEMAND
In India, demand for power currently surpasses supply by ten to fifiteen percent, with the
shortfall on peaks at approximately thirty percent.' 9 The Central Electricity Authority (CEA)
estimates that the country will require approximately 142,000 MW of new capacity by 2007,
against an expected capacity addition of about 60,000 MW, leaving a minimum shortfall of
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82,000 MW.4° The Indian Government has indicated that it expects the private sector to
provide the 60,000 MW of new capacity.4
B. REFORM OF THE POWER SECTOR
Since the 1950s, development of the electric industry belonged exclusively to the State.42
The Electricity Supply Act of 1948 (Act) established the CEA, whose responsibilities include
controlling the development of major generation projects. 4' The Act also created State Electricity
Boards (SEB) as vertically integrated monopolies. 44 India's policy of State control over power
generation remained in effect until 1991 when the Indian Government acknowledged that an
influx of private capital was necessary in order to facilitate funding of its capacity expansion
program. 4' Financially strapped SEBs lacked the ability to attract the capital required to remedy
India's dramatic power supply deficit." India consequently opened up its national electricity
sector to reform in 1991 by allowing private investors to participate in the power generation
sector. As a result, the Act was amended in 1991 to permit private ownership of generating
companies.4 7 The new amendment provides that generating companies may enter into power
purchase agreements (PPA) with SEBs to which the IPPs will sell their electric output.4 The
Indian Government also established various incentives to attract foreign investors, including a
special capital gains tax rate of ten percent for international IPPs, versus twenty percent for
domestic entities. 4'
C. DUAL SYSTEM IN POWER SECTOR: ROLE OF FEDERAL AND STATE AUTHORrrIES
The Indian Constitution stipulates that both federal and state authorities shall share jurisdiction
over the power sector."0 The regulatory structure reflects this system of dual jurisdiction by
granting the central government and state governments roles in the power sector." While the
goal of the Act was to provide for coordinated development of the power sector, the dual
system has frustrated implementation of IPPs in India.5
Although the Indian Government intends to promote competitive bidding in future indepen-
dent power transactions, most IPPs have been pursued through negotiation." Negotiations
for an IPP generally involve a long and arduous process due to political maneuvering and the
country's onerous bureaucracy. For each IPP, a developer must obtain numerous approvals
from state and federal authorities, and negotiate a PPA and fuel supply agreement acceptable
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18, 1996.
41. India Ends Environmental Requirement for IPP Projects of Less Than 250 M W, UTILrIY ENVIRONMENT
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to both authorities.5 4 The federal CEA must dear any project whose cost exceeds $285 million."
The developer also must obtain a sovereign guarantee of payment under the PPA. 56 Since
most of the SEBs to whom the IPPs will sell their electric power production are in debt,
developers must secure government guarantees to assure that electricity purchase obligations
under long-term PPAs will be met. 7 When the ruling parties in the federal and state governments
have differing ideologies, the processes described above become political issues.
D. Two IPP EXPERIENCES: ENRON AND CMS
In 199 1, the Indian authorities designated eight "fast track" IPPs for speedy dearances and
sovereign guarantees that induded Dabhol Power Co. (Dabhol) and CMS Generation Co.'s
(CMS) project in the Andhra Pradesh State.'" The ambitious pace failed to materialize, as is
illustrated below.
1. Dabbol Power Co.
The slow progress of IPPs in India is reflected in the infamous Dabhol case. The 2,450
MW oil and gas-fired project in the state of Maharashtra has faced a series of obstacles during
power struggles between the central and state governments. Enron Development Corp. (Enron)
negotiated an initial PPA with the state's former Congress Party-led government. 5 During
the 1995 elections, the opposition parties turned the sensitive pricing of power matter under
the PPA into an election issue."0 When the Congress Party lost the election, the new state
government, consisting of a coalition between two Hindu nationalist parties, Shiv Zena and
the BaharatiyaJanata Party, unilaterally decided to cancel the project."' The state government
argued that the agreement had been negotiated in secret and lacked transparency, that project
costs had been padded by Enron, and that the power sale tariffs were excessive.62 The price
of power charged by IPPs since has become a delicate commercial and political issue throughout
negotiations with states that are concerned about the fairness of their deals. 6' The coalition
government initiated legal action in Indian courts to cancel the project.64 However, such legal
actions failed, with the courts noting their disapproval of political actions that were jeopardizing
projects clearly in the country's public interest."'
This series of events forced Enron to suspend work on Dabhol for over a year, from August
1995 to December 1996.66 In an effort to save the project, Enron agreed to renegotiate the
agreement. In January 1996, Enron agreed to cut Dabhol's cost, and to reduce tariff rates from
6.5 to 5.3 cents/kWh.6" In July 1996, Enron signed a new PPA with the Maharashtra SEB."
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The payments for the SEB's power purchase obligations have been guaranteed by the Indian
government.69 Most observers viewed the state government's decision to dedare the contract
null and void as politically motivated. 0 The fact that the Dabhol agreement could not survive
a change in government at state level is likely to discourage other foreign-sponsored IPPs in
India.
2. CMS Generation Co.
CMS's 470 MW, gas and naphtha-fired power plant inJegurupadu, Andhra Pradesh, became
the first foreign-owned IPP to go on-line on August 6, 1996.7 The plant should be fully
operational by mid-199775 The long-term PPA between CMS and the state government
confirms that the IPP will supply its entire electric output to the Andhra Pradesh Electricity
Board.73 CMS daims that it owes its success to finding a local partner for the project, GVK
Industries.74 CMS argues that enlisting local partners provides a certain degree of protection
to foreign-sponsored IPPs since authorities will be less likely to question the activities of domestic
investors.77 In spite of its recent success, CMS experienced several contractual setbacks for its
"fast track" project.76 Negotiations continued for four years due to political foot-dragging before
the project was implemented." The company repeatedly was forced to renegotiate its PPA to
modify the tariff level at which the IPP would sell electricity to the SEB.' 8
Of the eight "fast track" projects only three have received all approvals necessary for implemen-
tation. 9 They indude: Dabhol, CMS's project, and the Godavari Basin in Andhra Pradesh
sponsored by Spectrum Technologies Ltd. (Spectrum).80 Spectrum abandoned its efforts to
obtain a sovereign guarantee from the central authorities after a substantial wait, and obtained
one instead from Industrial Development Bank of India."' Since 1991, almost 190 project
proposals have been received, including forty-six from foreign companies, for a total capacity
of 75,260 MW, to be undertaken as negotiating transactions.8 2 Approximately 149 of them
have received some sort of follow-up treatment from the Indian authorities."3 Eighty-five have
been accorded "in-principle" approval.84 Basic groundwork has started in fifteen cases.87 Finally,
dose to fifteen additional proposals have advanced to the next stage of techno-economic ap-
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proval.'6 However, prior experiences dictate that this review will be lengthy. Thus, a substantial
number of private, independent power proposals remain in limbo.
E. CONCLUSION
The Indian Government has attempted to facilitate development of private IPPs by waiving
certain clearances. Projects of 250 MW or less can proceed without approval from the CEA."7
The federal government also has dropped its requirement for environmental clearance of such
projects.8" Currently, the federal authorities are considering shifting environmental clearance
for projects of 250 MW or more to the individual states.8 9 In addition, the Indian Government
is in the process of developing a comprehensive energy policy which should establish clear
guidelines to govern implementation of IPPs.90 Pursuant to this policy, the authorities are
drafting a model fuel supply agreement, based on international standards, to further facilitate
IPPs.9" Finally, as part of the policy, the government is considering the creation of independent
regulatory entities at the federal and state levels in order to foster a "friendly" private investment
environment."2 Overall, however, political uncertainties have hampered completion of IPPs in
India despite the country's liberalization of its power sector. One observer has recommended
drawing up support across party lines for power projects to circumvent political twists."' Until
political instabilities are resolved within India, IPPs will remain a "risky business" for private
investors.
III. Mexican Gas Opportunities in Power Generation
Electric power generation represents a significant future market for natural gas in Mexico.
Several factors contribute to this nascent market opportunity, including (1) Mexico's need for
additional electric generation; (2) legal and regulatory reforms aimed at increasing competition
within the country's natural gas sector by permitting private investment in and development
of a natural gas infrastructure; (3) clean air quality mandates requiring reduction of emissions
from oil-burning plants and general migration to the use of cleaner fuels; and (4) Mexico's goal
to ultimately privatize a significant portion of the electricity sector. These efforts have facilitated
the development of several private, gas-fired power projects within Mexico, as will be discussed
in this article. These projects have been the subject of sporadic, costly development efforts in
the past several years. The ultimate tests of whether Mexico is committed to the full opening
of the electricity and gas sectors of its economy lie ahead.
A. MA xico's NEED FOR ADDITIONAL ELECTRIC GENERATION
Mexico needs additional electric generation capacity. Power consumption has grown by an
average annual five percent rate in the last ten years, compared with two percent in the United
States.94 The state-owned utility Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE) estimates that the
86. Id.
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country will need approximately 8,000 MW of new gas-fired, combined-cycle generating capac-
ity by 2004, out of a total need for 12,000 MW of new capacity during the period, a thirty-five
percent increase from current capacity." By 2010, Mexico forecasts it must add a total of
30,000 MW of new generating facilities to meet projected increasing demand. 6
Demand for additional gas-fired electric generating capacity is increasing due to Mexico's
economic recovery from the debt crises of the 1980s, as well as the peso crisis of December
1994, growing industrialization and commercialization (particularly in the northern states), and
expanded environmental regulations.
B. REFORM OF GAS SECTOR: IMPACT ON ELECrRICrrY SECTOR
The Mexican Government further committed itself to privatization of its energy sector when
the United States and the International Monetary Fund required such efforts as part of the
conditions of the S 50 billion loan packages extended to Mexico when it experienced an economic
crisis in January 1995 due to a dramatic peso devaluation." In response, the country has
implemented various legal and regulatory reforms aimed at strengthening and opening Mexico's
energy sector. Changes in Mexico's gas sector will affect significantly the development of
Mexico's electricity sector.
98
1. Five-Year Energy Plan
In February 1996, President Ernesto Zedillo launched a five-year energy plan: the Program
for the Development and Restructuring of the Energy Sector 1995-2000 (Plan). The Plan is
designed to (1) increase crude oil and natural gas production, (2) promote foreign investment,
and (3) produce cleaner fuels in the future." The Plan calls for the construction of new generation
plants to prevent shortages after 1999.'" A brief summary of the Plan is set forth below:
a. Increase Oil and Gas Production-The Plan notes that, in recent years, the energy sector
in Mexico, including electricity generation, has suffered from underinvestment, which in turn
has affected production levels."' Consequently, Mexico has acknowledged the need to use
fuels other than oil, the predominant fuel, for electric power generation. Furthermore, increased
production of natural gas will be necessary to respond to a growing demand for gas that will
skyrocket in light of recently expanded environmental regulations discussed below.
b. Encourage Private Investment-The development of reserve levels and production capacity
requires massive investments in exploration and production. Because of public sector financial
restraints, private investment in power generation and natural gas transportation, distribution,
and marketing will be encouraged by the Mexican Government. "2 The Plan notes that amend-
ments to the Electric Power Public Utility Law in 1992 opened the door to private investment in
activities previously reserved to the CFE, induding independent power production, self-supply,
95. Id.; see also, Mexico's 8,000 M W Gas-Fired Need May Help Fuel Gas Rusb in Latin America, INDEPENDENT
POWER REPORT, May 31, 1996.
96. Mexico Issues Solicitations for Five Private Power Prects, 1,500 MW, INDEPENDENT POWER REPORT, May
17, 1996.
97. Diego Cevallos, Mexico: Unions and Business Sector Uneasy on Privatization, INTER PRESS SERVICE, February
13, 1996.
98. Mexico's 8,000 MW Gas-Fired Need, supra note 95.
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co-generation, and small production."°3 The Plan explicitly directs the CFE to promote power
plant leasing and independent power production projects." It sets forth the CFE's policy as
follows: public investment resources will be concentrated in the areas of power transmission
and distribution, while private investment will be promoted in generation facilities." 5 The
Mexican Government intends to use the energy sector as a means to generate hard currency
and labor, spur more investment, and improve the Mexican economy overall."o
C. PROMOTE CLEANER FUELS
In the past, the state monopoly, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) supplied most of the fuel
used by CFE in its generating facilities. PEMEX mainly supplied high-sulphur crude oil and
liquid propane gas to power plants that caused significant environmental damage. Accordingly,
the Plan indicates its strong support for the substitution program of CFE which requires trans-
forming gas into the prime fuel of power plants by converting existing oil-burning power plants
to gas and promoting gas to generate electric power."'
2. November 1995 Legislation
On November 8, 1995, legislation became effective allowing private investors, domestic and
foreign, to participate in the transportation, storage, and distribution of natural gas within
Mexico. 0  Prior to 1995, the oil and gas business was under exclusive state control through
PEMEX, the government-owned oil and natural gas company. Liberalization of Mexico's gas
sector has opened up opportunities for private investment in the country's energy sector, which
should increase reserves and production.
3. March 1996 Regulations
On March 20, 1996, Mexico's Energy Regulatory Commission, Comision Reguladora de
Energia (CRE),0 9 issued regulations covering the pricing of natural gas by PEMEX, establishing
a pricing regime for distributors and pipelines, and methodologies for developing tariffs for
103. Id. The Electric Power Public Utility Law was amended in 1992 to allow private investors to participate
in Mexico's power generation sector under four different schemes, as: (1) an independent power producer selling
its entire electric output to the CFE, (2) a co-generation project selling steam to industrial customers and power
to the CFE, (3) a self-generator selling power to industrial users, or (4) a small producer selling power to small,
rural communities. Mexico's CFE Issues Solicitationfor 440 M W Merida Power Plant, INDEPENDENT POWER REPORT,
June 3, 1994. For further discussion of the Electric Power Public Utility Law, see infra note 109.
104. Supra note 99.
105. Id..
106. See Energy Sector Trends, MExico BusINESS MONTHLY, January 1, 1996.
107. See supra note 99.
108. See Regulatory Law of the Constitutional Article 27 on Petroleum and the Regulation of Natural Gas,
November 8, 1995.
109. The CRE was created in 1993, pursuant to amendments to the Electric Power Public Utility Law. See
Mexico's CFE to Solicit Proposals for 300 MW Private Power Project, ELectrIuc UTLrrY WEEK, August 30, 1993.
The CRE, loosely modeled after the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, is charged with various responsi-
bilities, including (1) supervising the application of new regulations, (2) guaranteeing "a level playing field" for
all participants in the electricity sector, and (3) providing certainty in the relationship between the CFE and private
power producers. To this end, the CRE has regulatory jurisdiction over the CFE. The amendments were part
of reforms instituted by the government in order to promote private investment in Mexico's electricity sector
in areas formerly within the exclusive control of the CFE, including the construction, operation and ownership
of power plants. Id. For further discussion of the Electric Power Public Utility Law, see supra note 103.
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regulated services.' The regulations were implemented to provide a dear and equitable regula-
tory framework for private investment in the natural gas sector. The rules also are indicative
of Mexico's commitment to opening up its energy sector.
The new regulations should rapidly expand the demand for natural gas. The Ministry of
Energy expects 5 5 billion in investments in gas infrastructure over the next four years to meet
an expected thirty-five percent increase in gas demand."' Liberalization of transportation,
distribution, and storage of gas will promote gas as fuel to power electric-generating plants.
By opening its gas-transmission infrastructure to private investors, Mexico hopes to jump-start
its private-power market."'
C. AnR QUALITY REGULATIONS
Mexico's escalating gas needs are driven in large part by recent air quality regulations that
will take effect in 1998, significantly curtailing the burning of fuel oil in existing power plants."'
The CRE established an official standard (NOM-086ECOL-1994) to use clean fuels."' The
rules require 8,000 MW of new gas-fired capacity, as well as the conversion of all oil-burning
power plants to gas by 1998 in order to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions."' Demand for natural
gas will increase substantially as a result of these requirements.
Mexico intends to reduce fuel oil's share of generation from seventy percent in 1995 to
thirty-six percent in 2004.116 During the same period, gas-fired generation would grow from
sixteen percent to forty-six percent,"' resulting in an increase in consumption from 500 MMcf/
day at present to 1.8 Bcf/day in 2004." '
D. PRIVATE GAs-FIRED POWER PROJECTS
The changes and goals enumerated above have facilitated the development of various private
power project proposals, as discussed below. The Mexican authorities estimate that twenty
new private power plants totaling 9,000 MW are needed to cover projected annual increases
in demand of 3.5 to 4.9 percent." 9 Some $9.5 billion of private participation is required by
this sector. 2° There is a high level of interest in gas-fired facilities, as reflected by the numerous
statements of interest received by the CFE in response to various gas-fired project proposals.
1. Privatization of Eketric Sector
In January 1996, the Mexican Government outlined a program to privatize the country's
electric sector.' 2' The program envisages collaboration between the private and public sectors
110. See Mexico Sets Formulas, Regulations for Natural Gas Liberalization Plan, THE OIL DAILY, March 21,
1996; Mexico Takes Major Step Toward Open Market, GAs DAILY, March 21, 1996.
111. John Javetski &Jeffrey Reyser, New Gas Finds, Pipelines Sbaping Latin American IPP Environment, ELcrsu-
CAL WORLD, September 1996.
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115. Javetski, supra note 111. See, also, supra note 95.
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to increase competition for producing the amount of capacity that the country requires."'
Pursuant to the program, the construction and operation of new power plants will be handed
over to the private sector.1
23
2. Private Power Projects
By the end of 1996, CFE intended to initiate the bidding process for five private power
projects totaling 1,600 MW it released for solicitation in May.2 4 Power production will be
sold to state-owned CFE. Initial production from the proposed projects is expected in 1998,
with all projects in commercial operation by 2000.12 The Mexican Government is interested
primarily in build-operate-transfer or build-lease-transfer agreements. 2 ' The projects include a
450-MW, gas-fired plant in Rosarito, Baja California; a 450-MW, gas-fired plant in Chihuahua
City, Chihuahua; a 450-MW, gas-fired plant in Monterrey; a 100-MW geothermal plant, in
Cerro Prieto, Baja California; and a 150-MW, gas-fired plant in Rosarito Beach.' 27 The CFE
received dose to ninety expressions of interest in response to its May solicitation, induding
thirty-three from U.S. companies, twenty-three from Canadian firms, twenty from Mexican
companies, and eleven from other countries. 2 ' The gas-fired power projects will require the
construction of gas pipelines to supply gas to the plants. The tenders for such pipeline projects
have not yet been made by the CFE. However, a variety of gas companies, including U.S.
companies, have expressed interest in the projects.
a. Merida III Power Plant-CFE is continuing to encourage development of the 440-MW,
gas-fired combined-cycle Merida III independent power project located on the Yucatan Penin-
sula. CFE wants construction to start in 1997 and commercial operation to be achieved by
2000.2' CFE will sign a twenty-five-year contract for purchase of the power production." °
The selected developer must finance, build, and operate the plant."'
In November 1996, the CFE received formal proposals from eighteen international compa-
nies, induding U.S. firms, consisting of six consortia interested in the build-lease-transfer proj-
ect." 2 Three Mexican companies also filed proposals."' The winning bidder will be announced
in March 1997, one month after the announcement of the builder of the gas pipeline to serve
the plant.'
The solicitation for Merida III was offered in conjunction with development of the pipeline
needed to bringgas supplies to the project. The 330-mile, $400 million pipeline, with a maximum
122. Id.
123. Id.
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volume of 272 Mcf/day, will run from the Tabasco state to the Yucatan.'" It will supply
Merida III and several additional power projects totaling 650 MW designated for the area,
including the 150-MW Lerma, 168-MW Merida II, 45-MW Nichicocom, 75-MW Valladolid
Vapor, and a planned 212-MW Valladolid plant." 6
b. Samalayuca II Power Plant-Samalayuca II is a proposed $647 million, 700-MW com-
bined-cycle, gas-fired power plant in Chihuahua near Ciudad Juarez. The three units totaling
700-MW are scheduled to come on-line in 1998."' The plant is expected to provide 13,000
MW during the next ten years.
3
8
Samalayuca II represents the first privately funded power project in Mexico."' In May 1996,
a consortium reached financial dose on the plant and construction began a few months later.'"
Once all five units of the Samalayuca plants are operating, including two existing generating
units with the ability to burn gas, 172,000 MMBtu/day could be transported to the plant.
141
A consortium of various international companies, including U.S. and Mexican firms, reached
agreement with CFE to build the plant. 142 CFE will lease and operate the plant for twenty
years and then take ownership. 143 Each company holds an equity stake in the project.' The
project is supported at the highest levels of the Mexican Government. President Zedillo, Secretary
of Energy Jesus Reyes Heroles, Secretary of the Treasury Guillermo Ortiz Martinez, and CFE
general director Rogelio Gasca Neri were present at the project's final signing ceremony. 145
In the first contract of its type, El Paso Energy Co. (El Paso) recently signed an agreement
with PEMEX forming a consortium to bid on the right to provide natural gas transportation
from the United States to the plant, in response to the CFE's request for proposals.'" The
CFE was expected to announce the winning bid prior to the end of 1996.' 4, If their bid is
selected by the CFE, El Paso would construct a pipeline to the U.S.-Mexican border and
PEMEX would add a line to bring gas to the plant. 14 El Paso intends to build thirty-six miles
of lateral pipeline to deliver natural gas from U.S. producing areas to Samalayuca. 14'
E. CONCLUSION
Opportunities for private investors within Mexico's gas sector are increasing due to legislative
and regulatory reforms. Other pipeline and gas distribution system projects currently are being
developed in Mexico to improve the country's gas infrastructure, generating substantial competi-
135. See supra note 129. See also, Mexico/Pipelins: Yucatan Line Moves Closer, INTERNATIONAL GAs REPORT,
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tion among foreign investors eager to enter Mexico's energy market. An improved gas infrastruc-
ture should facilitate the implementation of future gas-fired power projects. Moreover, gas is
to become the primary fuel for power plants in accordance with expanded environmental
requirements. Consequently, the evolution of Mexico's electricity sector is tied to changes in
the gas sector. In addition to opening part of its gas sector to private investment, the Mexican
Government has permitted private investors to participate in the electric power generation
sector. These reform efforts should drive Mexico to further increase its gas-fired, electricity
capacity generation in order to respond to growing electric power consumption, a trend expected
to continue in the future.
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